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COMMUNICATION  FROM  THE  COMUISSION  TO  THE  COUNCIL - 1-
INTf(llJQ'l'lCti 
1.  '!be  gecera.l.1za:l  systan  of  prefereooes,  des1.gnsi  to  give  d.evelop.Ulg 
countries l'lX)I'e  favoura.ble aooess  to the :ma;rkets of d.evelopai oountries, is 
DCN  in its twentieth  yea.r.  Coooeivm in the  early  19603  within ~. 
lan'll()hei  at the  2Di mcrAD Conferenoe in New  Delhi in February--Marob.  1968 
am fim.lizai by Resolution 21(II) of the Speaial. CCmnittee  on Preferences 
in  Ootaber 1970,  it  was  sul:sequentl.  y  1:mpl.emented  by  means  of  various 
national. sohenes.  '1lle  C!ammmi ty was  cme  of the first iirlustriaJ..izai powers 
to introduce such a  scbeme (on 1  cJ'ul  y  19'71) . 
2.  Intemei to p:raoote  the  eocmomio  d.evelopoent  am  .1Ixlustr1 aJ 1 zation of 
'lbird  World  countries,  am  therefore  reserved  for  than  alone,  it  was 
ad.opta1  by derogation to the rules of Article 1  of  the  GA'IT  (Dec1s1 on of 
the con~  Parties to  the GA'IT  of  25 June 1971)  for  a  period of  ten 
yea.rs,  then renewe:i in 1980 by a  rY!!N  derogation,  this time  on a  permanent 
ba.sis  (enab11 ~  clause adoptei by  the COntraot:Lng  Parties to  the GA'IT  on 
28 Novelllber  1979)  . 
In 1990 the ~is  therefore due for its ten-yearly overba.ul. by UNCTAD. -2-
3.  It  1B  aocordlllgly  t:1Joe  for  tbe  Ccmnun:1.ty  to  carry  out  a  rigorous 
exam1 na.tion  of  the  past  ani  present  opem.tion  of  its  own  generalizei 
preferences scheme ani to draw the necessary ooool.usians for tbe future,  in 
the  light of its l::lasic  aim  - economic  ani iDiustri.a.l  developnent in the 
Third World  - aocount being taken of the ~es  which have  taken place in 
the  international  economy  ani trade  system sinoe the GSP  was  set up:  the 
GSP  oa.n  on1  y  be  judgai aga.inst  this ba.ckgrouD:i. 
* 
*  * 
I.  TRB  SI'IUATIOO  'lO IWI'E 
4.  The  Genera.J..izfn  System  of Prefereooes  (GSP)  was  set up at tbe em  of 
tbe  1960:1  for  the  grant:mg  of  preferent1&1.  tariffs  ani  based  on  the 
pri.Doiples  of  autaoauy,  :oon-reaiprocity  em  non-d.:l.sarimination  between 
benefic:l..aries.  At that tilDe: 
the  i.Diustria.lized.  members  of  the GATl'  had relatively high levels of 
tariff protection; 
there were  few  free  trade agreements  between  1mustr~  countries 
(the Ero ani EFl'A  Agreements did not enter into foroe until 1973); 
few  developing countries partiaipa.tai in tbe GATr  negotiat:Wg ~1  nery 
ani the resul.  t:Ulg mu1 tilateral disc.1pl1 nes; 
the gap between levels of un:ierdevelopuent in the various beneficiaries 
was  :relatively small. 
When  it was  set up,  the  GSP  was  a  useful  i.Dstrument  for  the  beneficia.ry 
countries:  the margin of prefereooe was  sutstant1&1. ani representai a  real. 
advantage aver the tariff trea;bnent which ii:dust:riaJized. countries grantai 
each other.  The SiS"tem  also offerEd developing countries an alternative to - 3-
GA'1T  negotia.~ JMCb1nery  (which  bad  hitherto  been  the  only  a.va:llahle 
metboi for obta.1..niilg  genera.lize:i tariff rmuctions) ,  freeing  them  from the 
ooostraints  of  mu1 tilatera.l.  discipl1  res  while  protecting  them  from 
arb:l.:trary c:tisarim:illa.tion. 
5.  Over the last twenty years the situation has ~ai  sul:sta.ntia.l.ly with 
regard to these four points, a.m.  many  others. 
A.  Erosion of the DJa.T.$1n  of p:ref~ 
6.  .Ievels  of  tariff  protection  in  d.evelopa:l  countries  have  .been 
substantially  raiuoai  by  the  oamh1nffl  effect  of  the  multilatera.l. 
d1R!Mntl.ing of tariffs a.t  the eDi of the Tokyo  Rolmi  (the arithmetic mean 
iniustriaJ. tariff of the d.evelopsi oountries fell  from  10.4%  to  6.4%)  a.m. 
tbe  multipl.ioation  of  free  trade  areas  or  oustoms  unions  between 
.i.D:iustriallzed.  oountries  umer  Artiale XXIV  of  the  GAT!'  (~  a.m.  EFTA, 
Austra.l.ia.  a.m.  New  ZMJarrl,  Unitai  States  and  Canada,  suooesstve 
enlargements of the Ccmmmity). 
Fa1 1 1 rg levels of tariff protection have  resu1  tai in a. oo~  fa.l.l 
in the ma;rgm  of prefereooe enjoyei by GSP  beneficiaries. 
7.  These d.evelopuents,  while prov:1.ding new  multilateral opportunities for 
developing  oountry  trade  on  d.evelopa:l  country  markets,  unfortunate.l  y 
hig'.hl.ightai  the  fa.l.l  in tbe  margin  of  prefereooe  enjoyai  by  developing 
countries.  The  perception  lUOOil!  devel~  oountries  that  their 
prefe:rent1a.l.  a.ooess  was  lJe:l...rg  wh1 ttlai 81118.Y  was  reillforoai in this pericxl 
by the introduction by d.evelope:i oountries of oe:rta.1n  non-tariff measures 
a.ffeoting  developi.Ilg  country  exports  in  a.  number  of  sensitive  sectors, 
notably textiles. -4-
In the  case  of  the  Community,  the  factors  iniioa.ta:l in paragraph 4  were 
compouirlei by its special oontra.otua.l preferential relations wi.  th the  NJP 
ani  Me:li  terranean  countries,  which  by  tbe:1.r  nature  impliai  a  treatment 
superior to that prov:l.dsd by the GSP. 
In spite of these tren:is,  the GSP  oont:J IDles to he peroe1  vei as :t:mportant by 
both  the  Community  ani  the  d.eYelop:Ulg  oountries.  In  1988  d.eYelop:Ulg 
oountries  henefi  ta:l  from  a  raiuctiem  of  cust011s  duties  of  some 
EOJ  1  OCXl  milliem  em  EOJ 16 000 milliem  of  imports,  even  w1 th  raiuoai 
preferential margins. 
8.  These  changes in the international tradlllg  environment,  together with 
interna.l  d.eYelopnents  within the d.eYelop:Ulg  countries,  have  resu1  ta:l in a 
cba.nge  in their politica.l attitude to both GATl'  .inst:rumeots  a.m.  the GSP. 
Devel.opiDg countries are :U!crea.sii:lgly turni.Ilg tbe:1.r  hacks  on the doctrines 
of  :1JJiport  sul::sti  tutiem  ani  the  protectiem  of  infant  illiustries  ani 
recognizi.ng the beneficiaJ. effects on their eoaoomies of J..iJJe:raJiz:U  their 
markets.  Aga.:i.Dst  this  l:JaakgrouD:l  there  is  a  tendenoy  to  beocSDe  less 
ocmoernerl with d:Jm:Jn1sb1rg GSP  berlefits 8D:i  to focus instead em  negotiating 
bouixi am lasting oonoessions for their liberalization plans in tbe GATT. 
The  uruguay  Round  of  multilateral  trade  negotiations  prov:1.d.es  the  best 
opportunity for  consolidating th1s treDi.  Fo:l'  the first time  a  IDrrober  of 
d.evel.opiDg countries are play:trg an active part in the negotiations 8D:i the 
integratiem of devel.opmg  oountries in the system is cme  of tbe objectives 
agreai at Punta  del.  Este.  It sboul.d.  result  in a  furtber  d1SI!!6ll:tl.i.rg  of 
tariffs  8D:i  non-tariff  barriers  8D:i  tlms  f'urtber  raiuoe  the  alternative 
role of the GSP. 
B.  Uneven d.eyelopnent  a.nd  d.ifferentia.tion 
9.  From  its  outset  the  GSP  was  the  subject  of  very  strong  defensive 
rea.ctians  from  poll  tioa.l  ani  bushleBS  circJ.es  in the  Community  a.imei  at 
restrict:Wg the benefits of the preferecoe. - 6  -
One  of the factors recently put forwa.t"d.  to jutify such defensive reactions 
is  the  very  ma.rkOO.  difference  in the  developoent  levels  of  third  world 
ocnmtries. 
The  develop:illg  ocnmtries  are  no  lacger  a  boloogeneous  group.  Their 
situation ncr,;o  ranges from that of d.yDam1o  am competitive eoanomies,  mostly 
in Asia,  with  per  capt ta  1l'lQO!IIeB  equal  to, if not higher  than,  those  of 
oerta.1n  Community  Member  States.  to  that  of  the  poorest  of  the  least 
developed  ocnmtries.  where  the  vast  ma.jori  ty  of  the  population  is  at 
m1 n111PJJ1l  suhs1.steDOe  level.  Moreover,  the  d.evelopillg  ocnmtries  include  a 
rnDDber  of l.a:rge middle- or low 1nooroe countries (In:ti.a.,  Ch.i.na,  Brazil) with 
a  very ~  distribution of  1  nooroe  am  certain  higbly  developed  am 
campet1  ti  ve iniustria.l. sectors (see Annex: I)  . 
In one  secse  this develOJID9Ilt  is in a.ooordaooe  with the objectives of the 
GSP,  at  least  as  regards  the  ocnmtries  which  have  experiecoe1.  rapid 
fO)I'!Omj 0  growth. 
However,  it  has  also  :resu1. tal  in  an  ioo:rease  in  the  so-oa.llei 
"differentiation"  measures  intendai  to limit the ert.ent to which the JIXXl'e 
oampetitive  countries  benefit  from  the  GSP.  'lh1.s  in turn  has  msde  the 
scheme muob.  JOOre  oaupl.ex: to adm1nister. 
C.  Protection B.tXi  struotural adjustment 
10.  D:l.fferentia.tion  measures  am  all  measures  a.:1.ma:1  at  restri~ GSP 
benefits for  export1..ng  countries in order to protect the Community  market 
fran  exoessive penetration by sensitive prcducts are in fact  a  result of 
the very wide product ooverage of the Community  scibsoe am the fact that it 
applies to all devel~  ocnmtries am,  from this year.  to certain Eastern 
European  ocnmtries.  The  autcmamous  nature  of  the  GSP  makes  it easy  to 
1JIIpl.ement  such measures.  Most have been appliei differently to the various 
na.ticma.l  markets  within  the  Community,  precisely  to  offset  the  unequal - 6-
d.istr.il:ution  across  Community  regions  of  the  heoefi  ts a.ni  costs  of  the 
generalizOO.  preferezx>es  grante:l  to  d.evelop:t.ng  oountries.  'nle  interna.l 
machinery  for  allooa.ting  imports ~  the  Member  States  has  hitherto 
permitted  sufficient  regi.ODal  differentiation.  JJ.or.r.teverl  the  1993  single 
market  precludes  the use of  such internal ma.ctdrery  I  pl'['ticularly in the 
light of  judgment  61187 of the Court of Justice.  'lhe Community's princ1pa..l 
objective vis-A-vis  its weaker  regions  must  be  to  eooourage  a.Irl.  support 
their structural adjustment.  '!be  spur  to invest given by the prospect of 
the ~le  ma.rket in 1993 is to same ert.ent hel.p:Ulg to meet this objective. 
Moreover,  sub:rtantial  assi.sta.'ooe  from  tbe Cnmmnni ty'  S  structural  :f'w:rls  is 
~  oha:nnell Ed  into the weaker  regions  I  often with the spec.ific  a..tm  of 
maki rg  tradi  ticmaJ.  .iniustries  oore  compet1 ti  ve  a.Irl.  di.  ve:rs1fyi.ng  the 
eoonomies  of  the areas d.epeixlent  on  them.  Nevertheless  I  these a.re  medium 
to  long-term  tasks  am  in the  meantiJne  the  GSP  offer will  :need  to  take 
a.ocount  of the wl.nera.blli  ty of the weakest sectors/regions in the a.l:senoe 
of interna.l market barriers,  although this vulllerab111  ty should d i mini sh as 
the neoessa.ry adjustments are made. 
D.  Cost of the oompleg1 ty N'¥'1  unoerta:! nty of tbe 0Jmmm1 ty f!ChfW 
11.  'lhe  complexity  of  adm..Uli.sterirg  the  Community  .scbene  resuJ.  ts  in 
disproportionate costs in terms of tiJne,  nx:meyl  staff a.ni adm1nistration.1 
Mxlve  all  I  however  I  it results  in a  lack of  stah111 ty a.Irl.  clarity.  The 
simple fact  that the  ~anents  are :renewei  on an arnmal_  basis leads to 
permanent unoerta.inty which oonsiderabl  y  ban:lioa.p:J importers ani exporters  I 
restricts their scope  for long-term p1 armi rg am may  d.i.soourage  investment 
in tbe export .iniustries of the beneficiary countries. 
Certain quotas or zero-duty fixed. amounts  are so pop.1l.a;r  w1 th traders that 
they a.re  exhaustei d.urirg  the first three days  of  the year;  other  J.a.rger 
quotas disrupt d.istr.il:ution c1.rcu1ts by area.ting a  mad rush to benefit from 
the quotas which falsifies the normal oon:ti  tions of trade ani production. 
In  the  case  of  textile  products  these  problens  are  aggrava.  te:l  by  the 
effects  of  the  spec.ial  arrangements  applicahle  to  the  sector  (two  quota. 
periods  each year  I  retention of allooa.tion between  Manber  States  I  double 
return  to  the  reserve)  which  resu1  ts  in  breakdowns  in  supply  networks 
1  'lhe administrative complexities are illustrate:l in Annex II. - 7-
which  can  be  d.1Brupt1  ve  8Di  oe:r1:.aml.  y  bear  no  relation  to  oommerc1.a.l 
reality. 
12.  The  UIIpre:iictaJ:x1.1ity  oa.usei  by  quantitative  restrictiocs  is 
pa.:rticul.a..rl  y  ma.rkai in the  oase of  oe1 1 1  ~s.  Ce111 ~s are oore  flexihle 
than  quotas  ani  zero-duty  fixfd  8100Ullts  :beawse  the  duty  is  not 
a.utana.tioa.Uy  :re-establisbe:  wben  the  oe111 ~  is  :reacha'l,  rut  a  Member 
State or the Comndss1on may  ask for this to be done at any time tberea.fter. 
The resul.t is great uooerta.inty for suppliers 8Di 1lllporters ~  tbe 
fate  of  their  oonsignments.  This  unpraiictab1lity  is  a.nnoying  for 
bJS1 nesses 8Di is aooampanied by a  degree of 1nocms:i.steDcy,  if not a  form 
of injustioe.  Ttrleed.,  the fact that the duty can be re--esta.b1.isb at any 
mo:meo.t  after  the  oe1 1 1 ~ bas  been  rea.choo  the  ra:ruest  for 
re--esta.blishetoften  beiJlg  a  response  to  oommerc1.a.l  or  poll  tica.l 
imperatives,  by definition variable fran one  supplier 8Di one  Member  State 
to  another  - results  in  ~ty  of  trea.UIIent  between  beneficia.ry 
oountries. 
The effects of the systan of~  duties are equally ba.:rmful in 
tbe oase  of  "non-secsitive }R'Od.ucts  umer  su:rve1l.l.ame"  - the duty can be 
re-esta.bl.isba anoe a  "refereooe tbreshold" bas been  exoea:ioo  - ani even in 
the oase of nan-secsitive products. 
13. Moreover,  the quantitative limits which apply un:ier  the  <Xlmmunity  GSP 
scbeme to products which the devel~  oountries export JD.'901Bely  beoa.use 
they have a  oompara.tive advantage hit particularly bard EIQOilO!Il1es  which in 
some  oases  d.epem  for  their  externaJ.  revenues  on  just  o:ne  or  two 
competitive  prOO.ucts.  The  ma.rgin  of JR'ef'ereooe  for  agricultural  products 
is sometimes relatively small. 
14.  The  1mpa.ct  of the GSP  on in:iustr1a.J1za.tion varies ()()l'V31derably.  In a 
smaJ.J.  mJJDbe:r  of oountries where  per  capita 1noome  has grown  rapidly - tbe 
main benefic:iaries of tbe GSP  - the impact has clearly been positive.  It 
bas  also  been  pos1  tive,  al  tb.ough  less  so,  in those  oountries  which  have - 8-
ma.naga:l  to develop oerta.in oompeti  ti  ve export iniustries.  However,  it bas 
not  been  positive at all in  the  least  d.evelope:i  oountries.  Their  very 
smaJ.l  share - a  little av&:  1  cr.  - of trade in products oove:rai by the GSP 
may well be due to their smaJ.l share of world trade in i.Ixiustria.l products, 
but they clearly un:ieruse the system,  am  this must oount aga.inst it, even 
if it 1B  oot due to the system i tse1f,  s:1.I:vJe  the least d.evelopa:l oountries 
in theory  enjoy 1mJ1m1 ta:1  spea:lal  trea.'boent  with w1.der  product  coverage. 
There  a.re  many  reasons  for this Uirleruse  (admini.stra.ti  ve structures,  lack 
of information,  OCJ!'I!II!Im1oa,tion  problems).  HorNeve:r,  rules of origin clearly 
have a  restriotive effect. 
15.  Annex III deals at length with rules of origin.  Orig1na.lly intema:l to 
encourage  greater  i.Ixiustr1  a.1 1  za.tion  in  developing  oountries,  the  origin 
rules  define  the sul:stantial  prooessi.Dg  necessary  for  the  8CX!U1B1 tion of 
originating status  .. Most bellefioia.ry oountries have h9en unable to achieve 
the degree of prooess:1.ng required for oerta.in prcxiuots am have ~Y 
been nnabJe to bEmefit fran the preferezxJeS.  This is pa.rtioula.rly true for 
the least d.evelopBi oountries am in tbe tert1.1es am.  electronics sectors. 
'Ille pa.rtiou.l.arly rapid. d.evelopoent of intra-in:iustria.l trade,  as opposai to 
inter-iniustria.l  trade,  B1gnaJ.s  a  tram for  production to  be  spread  av&: 
several oountries  wh1.ah.  runs  oounter  to the vertioa.l integration required. 
by certain origin rules.  It is therefore essential to adapt  the rules to 
modern international. trade practioe, witbou.t forgetting tbe nea:1 to reserve 
preferential  trea.'boent  for  those oountries which neei it am  for  which it 
1B  int.enia1.. 
II. GUTIJB[.JJmS  mR THR  Nm' IBr.AI1R 
16.  'Ihe. Community  must  draM  all  the  appropriate  oonclusions  from  the 
situation d.esar.ilJe:i above. 
'Ihe  at'it.1c1sms  made  could  lead  to  the  ocmclusion  that  the  GSP  1B  an 
outdata:l  :Ulstrument  which  shoulcl  DCM  be  scrappei.  'Ihe  ocmclusion  oould 
also  be  that it should  be  Sl.lMta.ntia.lly  improvai.  This is the  approach -9-
which the Commi ss1 on is p:roposiilg to the Coumil. 
Scrapp:i.Dg  the GSP  would  8100UD.t  to an ack::cowlErlgeDent  of  1 nahi  1 1 ty to 
dea.l with UDSOlve:i developnent problems which still nea:l a  response. 
A  oamme:rcial  policy instrument  a.ilDai at stllnula.ting developoent  which 
is differentiated  with  rega.ro.  to  the  developi.Dg  oountries  therefore 
rerra1ns  imperative,  pu-ticularly at a  time when Comllnmity  policy with 
regard  to the Eastern European  oountries has  given rise to doubts in 
the  develop.:lDg  world  ooooern1.qt  the  priorities  of  the  COmmunity's 
external policy. 
Community  support  for  non-assoo:1.a  ted  developmg  oountries  must  go 
beyoni  f1na.nc1al  instruments,  even if these are suppJementai by other 
eoonom1o  cooperation  instruments.  'lbese  can  provide  cml.y  a  limited 
response  to  the  nee1s  of  the  develop:lDg  oountries:  iDcreas:1.Dg  trade 
rerra1 ns a  priority for their developoent. 
17.  With tb1s in mind,  Uirler what  OODi1. tians oan tbe GSP  oont:Ume  to be an 
adaJ:ua,te  instrument  for  achievi.Dg  the  objectives  of  developDent  am  the 
integration of developing oountries into international. trade? 
A.  Link between the G8P  6.1'rl  the muJ.t11ateraJ.  tm11~ B$f1iem. 
18.  The Genera.l.izai  System  of Preferences is no  l~er - as it aooe was  -
an a1  terna.ti  ve to GAT!'  macb1 nery.  GAT!'  instruments have h8xJme am,  with 
the uruguay  Roulld,  will beoaoe  more  ani more  tbe priority i.Dstrument  for 
developing  countries,  because  they  ensure  more  reJ  1 ahl  e  aooess  to 
1Irlustria.l.1zai  oountry  ma.rkets  than  GSP  ocmoess1 ons,  which  are  by 
definition revoc::8ble. 
19.  The  Uruguay  Rouni  provides  the  best  opportunity  for  progress  in 
integrating the develop:l.Dg  oountries into international. trade.  Although it 
is in the develop:l.Dg  oountries'  own  interest  to  liberalize their  import 
arrangements,  as  tb1s  will help  them  to  develop,  it is also  true  that, - 10  -
given  the  high  level  of  protection,  such  lil:lera.lizaticm  would  be 
fa.c1lltate:i by a  :positive evalua.ticm by tban of the advantages  they hr~ 
BMaY  £ram  the  negotiations.  '£be  developei  oountries  should  tbe:re:fore 
encourage  th:L9 process by making tbeir own  oontr.i.blticm. 
20.  If it is made  sufficiently  ocms:istent,  the  GSP  oan  become  a  useful 
complement to that eDi,  al:thoug'.b. it cannot be covered by the negotiations, 
since  it  must  retain  its  a.uto:oomous  nature;  in  effect  it  would  be 
equivalent  to  the  speedier  introduction far  the  benefic:1..a.cy  oountries  of 
the reiuctians in bolmi duties which w:lll be phas8i in as a  result of the 
uruguay  Roun:i;  this  oomplement  should  also  oomprise  back-up  measures  to 
support  the developi:ng oountries in their efforts to integrate  themselves 
into the enla.rgei GAT!'  multila.tera.l system. 
B.  A  re:newOO.  O)mnnmit.! sqhene for the dooaQe  l991-2CXX) 
21.  A  renewOO.  generalized  preferenoes  sohelre  should  be  attractive.  i.e. 
JllA3ni ~ful. rut also simpler.  more  stable aDd  more  tra.nspn-ent. 
The l:asic prinoipl.es are as follows: 
1.  the  oobf'JM3  sbrn,Jd  reoo:!n  OJ;!ell.  in  princ1ple.  to  the  Clll'l'eD.t 
bene£1o1 a:r1es; 
2.  the present product oove;raee sbnuJ d  be ma.1 nW  oo'l  a.n1  i.mpr<mrl wberever 
possible; 
3.  the  oobeme  Bhonl  d  be  a1 mpl 1 f1ffi.  Tb1s  simplifioa.  tion  oonst1  tutes  a 
sul:stantial  improvement  in the  rev:1.se:i  scheme.  It must  tberefore  be 
comp:rebeDsive.  It involves repl.ac.1..ng  quantitative limits for  products 
which  are  subject  to  customs  duties  with  a  DI!!M  approach  which 
reconciles two  equaJ.l  y important imperatives: 
the  need  to  maintain  a  sufficiently  J..a.rge  ma.Tg1n  of  prefereooe. 
particularly  for  the  least  developei  oountries,  to  make  it  worth 
traders'  while  using  the  systan,  without  which it may  be  even  more 
underused than at present; -11-
modulation  of  the  opening-up  of  the  Community  market  \lirler  the  revt 
scheme  as  a.  function  of  the  seosi  t1  vi  ty  of  the  prod.uots  ani  the 
oompetitiveness  of  the ~  country.  Modulation  would  be 
aocompaniei by a.  suspensive clause mald ng it poss1  h1 e  to react durmg 
the period of vaJ.idi  ty of the GSP  to unforeseen developne:nts  in import 
flows  for oerta.1n products. 
With  these  two  parameters  in m:ln:i  we  ha.ve  d.evi.sEd  a.  solution  for  all 
products subject to custans duties involving three poss1hl.e  trea.tments for 
each product/  oountry pa.ir: 
duty-free  entry,  without  quantitative  restriction,  for  the  vast 
majority of products,  pa.rtiCI.lla.t'ly ind.ustriaJ. products; 
reiuction  :1n  the  MFN  duty  (without  quantitative  restriction)  for 
products which a.re  reoogn1..zai as bellJg secsi  tive.  The reduotion sbould 
be  fixOO.  a.t  a.  variallle percentage  of  the  MFN  duty,  provid.ei  the  MFN 
duty  is not  lower  than  a.  miDimum  tbresbold,  which  ma.y  vary  from  one 
sector to aoother; 
exclusion,  pure  am.  simple,  of  produot/oountry pairs  whiab.  oannot  be 
fittei into either of the above categories,  eitbE.r beoa.use  the prcduct 
is extremely seosi  tive or because it it is not possi hl e  to reiooe the 
duty sufficiently to provide an aooeptabl.e ma.rg1.n  of preference. 
The criteria. for alloca.ting product/oountry pa.1rs to one  or other of these 
categories would he baBei not only on the level of  MFN  duty,  b.lt  a.lso  on 
past  take-up  of  ex:ist:lng  limits,  ani  oba.Ilges  aver  time.  In tbe  case  of 
exclusion  these  criteria.  would,  where  appropriate,  be  weig'h.tei  by  other 
general iDiicators (non-GSP  trade performa.noe,  per  capt ta  inDome,  etc.). 
4.  The  gtah1 1 1 ty  of  the  sobeme  sbou1d  in priciple  be  gua.ra.ntee1  for  a. 
period  of  application  of  a.t  least  three  years  with  a.  suspensive  cJ.a.use 
limi  tei to exoeptiona.l oases justifiei by criteria. relating to real market 
disruptiOil.  Confirmation  of  the  re-establi.shmet  of  the  duty  would  be - 12-
preoe:iai  by  notification  of  the  benefic.:l..a.ry  oountries.  OYerall  the 
Community  sbould. en::lea.vour  to ensure that l'eOOUrSe to the suspensive clause 
does not lead to a  reduction in the overall GSP  offer. 
5.  The  least  d.evelopai  oountries  would  oontimle  to  benefit  from  more 
favourabl.e  a.rrBDgaoents  involv1~ unrestricted  duty-free  entry  wherever 
poe;s1bJe. 
C.  Towards an 1 mnva,tive a,p,groacb  to the iftOOrfll 1 zai S$itaD of pretereooes 
22.  The  sul:sta.ntia.l.  oantribltion which  this new  policy requires  from  the 
Community will be :f'ull.  y  rewa.1'd.Erl if  the new policy is drawn up  jointl.  y with 
the  Camnnmity's  OFXJD  partners  ani :ae.tcbai  by  similar  oontributians  from 
them. 
23.  It is inoonoe:l.vable  that :ae.jor  differeooes in tbe application of  the 
schemes,  suab. as tbe exclusion of entire sectors Ce. g.  textiles) ,  could be 
allowe:i  to  persist  between  daDDr  oountries.  A  h1 g'her  degree  of 
haxmcmiza.tion  of  donor  country  poliaies  is  nea1ed.  as  regards  product 
coverage. 
'lh1.s  wouJ..d.  br:I.Dg  two main advantages: 
for the devel~  oountries,  eKtension of the scope of the preferences 
they enjoy; 
for  the  donor  oountries,  a  better  distribution  of  the  buxden  of 
liberaliza.tion. 
24.  Such  a  oontribution  from  the  Community  sbould  take  aooount  of  the 
growing oa.pac:t ty of all tbe benefioia.ries to make their own  oontribution to 
liberal  1 z1 ng  trade for develop:l.ng countries. 
25.  '!his  means  in  particular  that  at  the  uruguay  Rouirl  the  Community 
expects  a  large  1DllDber  of  develop:l.ng  countries,  not  includ.i.ng  the  least - 13  -
developOO.  countries,  to enter into a  :r;n-ooess,  depeDding on their level of 
developnent,  lead1 ng  them  to  assume  more  ohl1gations  un1er  the  GAT!'. 
Active participation in the result of  the negotiations  on GAT!'  rules ani 
disoipl1  nes ani a.ooept&loe of .i.ncreasOO. mul. tilateral d1saipl1 nes as regards 
tariffs  am  non-tariff  issues  by  a  significant  number  of  developing 
oountries will give the Community  an important s:t.gnaJ.  aff~  the degree 
of  add1  tiona.l  libera.lization to be  offe:rai by the GSP  to all beoeficia.ry 
oountries. 
26.  As  regards  prefereooes  for  fi.sbery  prc:xiuots,  all factors  specific to 
the fisheries sector will be taken into oons:lderation. 
Z7.  It also means  that  the Community  inten1s  to  obtain a  oammitment  from 
the . most  developed  of  the  beneficia.ry  countries,  ani  from  the  Eastern 
Europea.u  countries. · to  open  up  their ma.rkets  to  imports  fran  developing 
oountries  in  the  same  way  as  it grants  them  Lnpt'OY61  aooess  to  the 
CQrmmm1 ty ma.rket. 
Z'Ta.  In addition,  the  Community  will aatively  seek  to  ensure  that  any 
supplementary  ()OJ'lOE':SS1 on  to  non-I.OO  am.  non-ACP  beneficia.'ries  will  he 
oampensatm by a  supplementary ~-up  of the markets of these oountries 
to the I.1'03. 
28.  Such  an approach introiuoes a  link - aJ. tboug'h not a  OOirl1 tiona.l one  -
between  .1Jllprovement  of  the  GSP  ani  1..ncrease:i  participation  of  the 
benefic1..a.ry  oountries in GAT!'  rules,  llril.ud.ing  the assuraooe  of praotioa.l 
oonoessions on their part in this oontext. 
This  is  1rxiea:i  an  innovative  approach  which  takes  a  much  mre  open  ani 
active  view  of  the  GSP.  However,  it 1s  not  revolutionary:  it is  the 
logioa.l  conolusion  of  a  process  which  sta.rte:l  long  ago  w1 th  the 
differentia  tal developne:nt  of developll:lg countries,  reflectai in the  19'79 - 14 -
eoohl1 rg  clause  ani  resu1 ~  finally  in  the  uruguay  Rouni  ani  the 
sul:stantia.l. integration of develop:illg countries in the negotiations. 
The  GSP  oa.nnot  rema.1.n  apart  from  thiB developnent.  rut must  take it into 
a.ocount,  aooampany it ani even faoilita.te it by mea:cs  of its complementary 
role, with due respect for GAT!'  rules in thiB field. 
HcMever,  we  must be cl.ea.r that thiB is not a  direct or iDdireot attempt to 
oontractualize  the  GSP.  The  GSP  must  rema.i.n  autonomous,  which  does  not 
mean  that it must remain ilDpermea.ble.  UNCrAD,  for its part, must also take 
a.ocount  of this developnent. 
29.  The  Comm1 ss1 on  is in any  oa.se  of  the  opinion  that  the  new  approa.ch 
pro:(X)S8i  is  the  cmJ. y  one  oa.pa.ble  of  enabJ :J rg  the  GSP,  an  essential 
instrument for the Community's developnent policy,  to play a  useful role in 
the years to oome. 
29a..  The implementation of rules an new  subjects at the em of the uruguay 
Rouni  of  negotiations  will  oonstitute,  thanks  in  particular  to  the 
J.ibe:raliza.tion of trade in services,  a.  potent:l.al.  source  of new  growth for 
the world ecx:momy.  This will nevertheless  enta.:IJ.  a  special effort an the 
pa.rt  of  the  develop:Ulg  countries  to  oaupl  y  with  the  new  disaipl  :J nes  ani 
take  full  advantage  of  the  resul  tirg expa:csion  in trade.  The  Community 
w:Lsbes  to eilOOlU'Bge  tbiB prooess am. will exam1 ne the steps which could be 
taken  under  oooperatian  programmes  or  one-off  measures  to  back  up 
developing countries'  efforts in the most  ad.equa. te manner  possible.  In the 
case  of  services,  it will  take aooount  in particular  of  their particular 
tra1  n1 ng  ~ts.  In more  gene:ra.l  terms it will a.im  to increase the 
oa.pa.oi ty,  in  particular  of  the  least  developEd  countries,  to  provide 
services at a  national.  level ani for  export.  It will exam:Jne  what  steps 
can be taken to faoilita.te a.ooess  to infonna.tian ani distrfrAltian networks. 
30.  It is pro:(X)S8i that the Council confirm the guidelines set out in this 
communication. 
In pract:tca.l t.e:rns,  it will not be poss:U:lle  to present a.  conarete. deta:Uai - 15-
proposaJ.  for  a  renewe1  GSP  before the positive oampletion of  the uruguay 
roun:i of negotiations at the eoi of the year. 
For  the  least--developei  oount:ries,  the  1:mprova:l  ruJ.es  of  origin will be 
implemente:i  in 1001  as  a  oont:ribltion to  the  Pa.ri.s  Conference  due  to  be 
held in September 1990. 1 
Chapter 1: Introduction. 
This paper has been prepared with a view to provide the necessary macro-economic 
background to the coming revision of the Community's Scheme of Generalised Preferences 
(GSP).  The  Community's scheme  was also  reviewed in  the  beginning  of  the  eighties. 
More  changes  were  introduced  in  1985,  notably  with  respect  to  differentiation  and 
graduation of  products from countries which had obtained a  substantial market share 
in the Community.  In  1987  changes were  introduced with  respect to  textile imports. 
The  Community introduced its GSP  scheme  in  1971,  following  the  adoption  of  a 
resolution  by  the  UNCTAD  special committee  on  preferences in  1970,  which  called  for 
granting  generalized  non-reciprocal  and  non-discriminatory  trade  preferences  to 
developing countries by the industrial countries. The  objectives  of  such  preferences 
were  to: 
- increase export earnings of developing countries, 
- promote industrialisation of developing countries and 
- accelerate  economic  growth in developing  countries. 
The  principle  of  'differential and  preferential  treatment'  was  incorporated  in 
the GATT  'enabling clause'  of  1979, and interpreted as allowing the  adaptation of  the 
GSP  benefits along  with  the  improvement  in  the  economic  status  of  the  developing 
countries. 
Much  has  changed  in  the  trading  area since  the  inception  of  the  GSP.  Among 
the  world's  top  twenty exporters there  were only  t~vo  developing· countries in  1973, 
today six developing countries belong to the group of the world's top t•o~enty exporters. 
Yet,  the  overall share  of  developing countries in  world  exports  has  remained  almost 
stable at  about  20  percent,  indicating that  there  has  been  a  strong  trend  towards 
differentiation. 
The  changed  position  of  the  developing  countries  in  the  international  trading 
system can  also  be  gauged  from  their participation  in  the  Uruguay  Round.  Contrary 
to  earlier Rounds  the developing  countries are  now playing  a  much  more  active  role. 
This  paper will  not deal with  the  question  of  the  effectiveness  of  the  GSP  as 
an  instrument of  promoting  export  gro~vth  in  developing  countries:  lv!uch  has  been 
written  on  this  subject,  particularly  up  to  the  mid-eighties.  Most  studies  concluded 
that the importance  of the  GSP  as an instrument for promoting  economic  development 
and  export diversification  has  been  limited,  yet at the  same  time  it has  been argued 
that the  GSP  has  never been implemented  in  a  manner as originally  envisaged  by  its 
protagonists,  for  example  because  product coverage  has  been limited,  particularly in 2 
product groups  of  interest to  developing  countries.  An  UNCTADV  study  sho'to~s  that 
developing  countries  \-J"Ould  be  only  slightly  worse  off if  all  MFN  rates were  set  at 
zero percent,  compared to  a  situation in  which there  was a  complete and  unrestricted 
GSP  coverage.  The  effect of  zero  MFN  rates  would  be  trade diversion,  as developing 
countries  would  lose  their  preferential  margin  over  competitors  from  industrialised 
countries, but this would be compensated for by trade creation, particularly favourable 
to  developing countries, as these countries face  relatively  high  MFN  rates and  tariff 
escalation. 
The  structure of  this  paper is  as  follows.  The  second  chapter  describes  the 
Community's  trade  relations  with  developing  countries,  both  in  qualitative  and 
quantitative terms.  This chapter serves basically as a  background chapter. The  third 
chapter analyses the  Community's  GSP  scheme as it has  evolved  during the  eighties. 
Some  conclusions are  summarised in  the last chapter, chapter 4. 
1/  G.  Karsenty  and  S.  Laird,  The  generalised  system  of preferences;  a  quantitat-
ive  assessment of the  direct  trade effects and of policy  options,  Discussion  papers 
ni:;.  18,  UNCTAD,  G~neva, 1986. CHAPTER  2:  THE  GSP  COUNTRIES  AND  EC  TRADE 
I.  THE  EC's  TRADE  POLICY  TOWARDS  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES:  THE 
PYRAMID  OF  PRIVILEGES 
The  European  Community  subscribes  to  the  fundamental  GATT 
principle  of  MFN  treatment  whereby  countries  cannot  discriminate 
between  countries  in  their  trade  policies.  Yet,  by  virtue  of 
other  GAlT-accepted  pri nci p'J  es  such  as  the  "enab·l i ng  clause",  the 
EC  does  grant  preferential  treatment  both  to  groupings  of 
industrialized  countries  with  whom  it  has  free  trade  area 
agreements  <namely,  EFTA>  and  to  most  developing  countries  as 
we 11 
Yet,  the  preferential  treatment  towards  LDCs  is  not  uniform.  On 
the  contrary,  depending  on  historical  and  gee-strategic  factors, 
the  .treatment  is  "more  preferential"  in  some  cases  than  in 
others.  More  precisely,  an  order  of  preference  often  called  a 
"pyramid  of  pri vi 1 eges"  can  be  di sti ngui shed  as  toll ows: 
1.  ACP  countries 
The  Lome  ~gr~~m~nt  between  the  EC  and  most  of  the  countries  of 
Africa,  the  Caribbean  and  the  Pacific  Ca  total  of  69  since  Lome 
IUl  grants  to  those  countries  tr~dg_ecgfgcgn~g§ that  virtually 
allow  for  duty-free  entry  of  industrial  exports  without  any 
quantitative  limitations.  Imports  of  agricultural  products  are 
virtually  duty  free  as  well  and,  within  some  quantitative  limits 
and  calendar  restrictions,  they  benefit  from  reductions  and 
suspensions  in  their  variable  levies;  furthermore,  sugar  and  beef 
have  a  secured  market  access  at  favorable  EC  prices.  The  EC's 
relationship  with  this  group  of  countries,  which  includes  the 
largest  number  of  Least  Developed  Countries,  is  the  most 
developed  and  privileged  among  those  with  LOCs. 
2.  Mediterranean  countries 
Within  a  globa·l  framework  common  to  all  the  val"ious  countries  of 
Southern  Europe  <Cyprus,  Malta,  TuPkey  and  Yugosl avi al  and  the 
Southern  (Algeria,  Egypt,  Morocco,  Tunisial  and  Eastern 
Mediterranean  <Israel,  ,Jordan,  Lebanon,  Syria)  the  EC  has 
economic  and  commercial  bilateral  jQ[ggmgnti  of  various  kinds 
<cooperation,  association,  customs  unions,  etcl  with  each  of 
those  countries  providing  for  financial  and  technical  aid  (11  and 
granting  important  trd~g_Qrgfgrgn,gi for  their  exports  to  the  EC. 
1.  Including  access  to  European  Investment  Bank  loans  from 
which  the  ACP  and  Mediterranr~an  countries  are  the  only  non-EC 
countries  to  benefit 
3 The  extent  of  the  trade  preferences  varies  with  the  countries: 
they  tend  to  below  those  granted  to  ACP  countries  bui  in  many 
cases,  tor  many  countries  and  for  many  products  they  allow  for 
duty-free  entry  of  industrial  goods  subject,  some  times,  to 
tariff quotas  or  voluntary  export  restrains. 
3.  The  GSP  beneficiary  countries. 
By  virtue  of  its  GSP  scheme,  the  EC  l.!Dil.srt:,g:c.s!ll!.!,  i.e.,  without 
the  mediation  of  a  Treaty  or  formal  agreement  and  without 
involving  reciprocity,  grants  a  series  of  ggng:c.s!li6gg  <in  the 
sense  they  are  extended,  in  principle  (2),  to  all  LDCs)  duty 
reductions  for  imports  originating  from  LDCs.  The  granting  of 
these  reductions  is  made  on  a  year-to-year  basis  but  within  a 
scheme  whose  structure  has  been  established  until  now  for  ten-
year  periods  (3). 
To  the  extent  that  GSP  concessions  are,  as  a  rule,  granted  to  all 
developing  countries,  all  LDCs  are  in  a  sense  "GSP  countries". 
However,  because  the  preferential  treatment  from  the  GSP  involves 
concessions  that  are  below  those  granted  by  the  Lome  Convention 
and  the  Mediterranean  agreements,  the  only  countPies  that 
effectively  make  use  of  the  GSP  scheme  are  the  non-Mediterranean 
Asian  countries  and  the  Latin  American  countries.  These 
countries  are  the  main  focus  of  this  paper  and  throughout  the 
remainder  of  it  they  are  alternatively  referred  to  as  "GSP 
benefi ci aries"  or  "GSP  beneficiary  countries". 
Regarding  semi-manufactured  <including  mining)  and  manufactured 
products  most  of  them  enjoy  GSP  treatment  and,  as  a  result,  their 
importation  is  duty-free  for  amounts  not  exceeding  certain 
ceilings  and  quotas.  However,  these  quantitative  restrictions  as 
we.ll  as  rules  of  origin  requirements  and  admin·istrative 
complexities  tend  to  limit  the  extent  to  which  GSP  benefits  are 
actual·ly  received.  Furthermore,  since  19e6  ·the  EC  has 
implemented  a  more  formal  approach  concerning  graduation  and 
differentiation  so  that  after  countries  reach  a  certain  level  of 
competitiveness,  they  are  faced,  on  a  product-by-product  basis, 
with  a  gradual  limitation  of  their  preferential  treatment. 
With  respect  to  textiles,  their  treatment  and  concessions  a~e 
di-fferent  from  those  affecting  the  other  industria·!  products. 
The1r  importation  also  benefits  from  preferential  treatment  but 
2.  However,  there  are  two  significant  exceptions  to  this 
princip.le:  Korea  and  Taiwan.  KoT'ea,  although  formally  a  GSP 
benetic1ary,  has  been  explicitly  suspended  since  19::::::,  and  on  a 
ternporaT'y  basis,  from  enjoying  the  preferences  of  the  system.  On 
the  other  hand,  Taiwan,  because  it  does  not  belong  to  the  UM 
organizations,  has  never  been  granted  GSP  treatment. 
3.  The  periods  referred  to  are  1971-1980  and  1981-1990. within  the  context  of  tariff quotas, 
by  Member  State;  furthermore,  this 
dependent  upon  potential  beneficiary 
export-restrain  agreements  within  the 
Arrangement. 
s 
some  of  which  are.allocated 
preferential  treatment  is 
countries  having  concluded 
framework  of  the  Multifibre 
With  some  of  these  countries  outside  the  Lome  and  Mediterranean 
accords,  the  EC  also  has  various  trade  and  cooperation  bilateral 
agreements  of  a  DQD=2refergn!iil  character  as  far  as  import 
barriers  are  concerned.  While  these  agreements  do  not  involve 
import  barrier  concessions,  they  normally  include  measures  to 
facilitate  and  promote  exports  from  those  countries  to  the  EC. 
Most  of  these  agreements  are  with  individual  countries  but  some 
of  them  are  with  groups  of  countries  instead.  More  precisely, 
the  EC  has  commercial  and  cooperation  agreements  with  the  ASEAN, 
the  Andean  Group,  the  Central  America  Common  Market  and  some 
Latin  American  (Mexico,  Brazil,  Uruguay,  etc.l  and  Asian 
(Bangladesh,  China,  India,  Pakistan,  Sri  Lanka,  Yemen,  etc.) 
countries.  A  second  type  of  trade  agreements  signed  by  th~  EC 
with  developing  countries  is that  of  those  under  the  framework  of 
the  Multifibre  Arrangement  already  mentioned  above. 
II.  The  EC's  TRADE  WITH  GSP  BENEFICIARY  COUNTRIES 
Whi  1 e  GSP  benefits  are  granted  to  LDCs  in  general,  not  all  of 
them  apply  and  receive  those  benefits.  For  1990,  133  countries 
and  2.5  territories  are  eligible  for  GSP  benefits  <4l. 
However,  not  all  of  these  eligible  countries  always  apply  for  or 
util1ze  tile  GSP  benefits  to  which  they  are  entitlE!d.  IndeE!d, 
because  the  Mediterranean  and  ACP  countries  often  rE!ceive  a 
better  treatment  under  their  bilatE!ral  agreements  than  under  the 
GSP,  they  choose  to  apply  for  GSP  benefits  only  for  some  products 
or  in  some  1nstances.  Still,  these  countries  retain  their 
ent1tlement  to  GSP  treatment  and  have  the  choice  to  apply  for 
those  benef1ts. 
Other  countries  do  not  have  that  choice  and  those  are  the  GSP 
beneficiar1es  in  strictu  sensu.  For  the  purpose  of  this  paper, 
" G  5 P  b e n e -f  ·1  c-i  a T' y  c o u n  t r i e s "  c o v e f' s  t  h o s e  c o u n t r i e s  t h a t  a r e  n o t 
e·ligibie  for  any  other  preferential  treatment  and  apply  for  and 
effectively  receive  GSP  benefits.  For  1988,  the  number  of  these 
4 .  .included  1n  this  number  are  Korea,  because  its 
preferences  have  been  only  suspended.  Also  included,  are  Hungary 
and  Poland,  two  countries  that  "for  the  first  time  have  beE!n 
brought  into  the  sclleme.  However,  both  of  thE!se  countries are 
exciuded  tf'om  the  preferences  for  steel  products.  For  a  complete 
1 i st  of  e I i g i b I e  countries,  consu It  thf!  Qffi!;;iELJQi!!::.C!.QL_QL!!:Jg 
fYCQEg.Q[!_~QmmYDitlg5,  L383/89. countries  was  56  C5l:  of  these,  20  countries  were  in  th~  American 
continent,  21  in  South  and  South-East  Asia  and  10  in  the  Middle 
East. 
GSP  beneficiaries'  exports  to  the  EC  accounted  for  ECU  83  billion 
in  1988.  As  shown  in  Table  I  below,  these  exports  represented 
more  than  one  fifth  of  all  EC  imports  and  about  ?Ot  of  all  EC 
imports  from  developing  countries.  It  will  be  noted  that  the 
share  of  both  developing  countries  in  general  and  GSP 
beneficiaries  in  particular  fell  marked.ly  between  19~:1  and  1988. 
This  is  because  many  of  the  oil-exporting  developing  countries 
are  i nc·l uded  in  the  GSP  and  the  decline  in  the  price  of  oil 
during  the  19El0s  is  the  main  factor  behind  the  fa 11  in  the 
relative  importance  of  GSP  beneficiaries'  exports  in  total  EC 
imports.  Indeed,  when  oi 1  is  excluded  from  both  tota·l  EC  imports 
and  EC  imports  from  GSP  countries,  the  share  of  the  latter  in  the 
former  appears  to  have  remained  stable  during  the  1980s  at  18-201 
Industrial  countries 
State  trading  count. 
Deve·l oping  countries 
Of  which: 
ACP 
Medit.  basin 
GSP  benet. 
TABLE  I 
GEOGRAPHICAL  STRUCTURE  OF  EC  IMPORTS 
<in  per  cent> 
1 981  1984  198B 
48  51  62 
8  1 0  ::: 
44  39  30 
6  7  4 
9  1 0  ::: 
34  21::  21 
GSP  benet.  ex c I .  fuels  1 :::  zo  1  ·=·  •J 
Note:  For  1981,  figures  correspond  to  EC-10.  For  the  other 
years,  to  EC-12.  The  sum  of  imports  from  the  various  developing 
country  groupings  exceed  total  imports  from  developing  countries 
due  to  a  certain  overlapping  between  country  groupings. 
Source:  J:urostat 
5.  The  complete  "listing  of  these  countries  is  1n  Appendix  I 
6 GSP  exports  to  the  EC  during  the  1980s  have  fluctuated  in  line 
with  world  exports  to  the  EC  which  have  also  fluctuated  during 
that  period.  This  partly  reflects  the  evolution  of  economic 
activity  in  the  Community.  The  decline  in  economic  growth  in  the 
mid-1980s  resulted  in  a  fall  of  both  total  exports,  and  LOCs' 
exports,  to  the  EC.  Its  recovery  in  recent  years  has  also 
resulted  in  an  important  recovery  of  global  exports,  as  well  as 
exports  from  LDCs  to  the  EC. 
As  Table  II  shows,  exports  from  LDCs  have  performed  less  well 
during  the  1980s  than  have  the  exports  from  industrialized 
countries.  As  already  noted,  the  decline  in  the  prices  of  fuels 
and  other  primary  commodities  which  LDCs  export,  helps  explain 
this  development.  As  shown  in  Table  II,  GSP  beneficiaries 
performed  below  the  LDCs'  average  during  the  early  part  of  the 
19i::Os,  about  average  in  the  middle  of  the  1980s  and  above  average 
in  the  late  1980s.  Yet,  when  fuels  are  excluded  from  the 
analysis,  exports  from  the  GSP  beneficiaries  to  the  EC  appear  to 
have  grown  well  above  the  LDCs'  average  throughout  the  whole  past 
decade. 
TABLE  II 
AVERAGE  OF  ANNUAL  GROWTH  RATES  OF  EC  IMPORTS 
<in  value  terms,  in  per  cent) 
1981-83  1984-86  19€:6-8:3 
Industrial  countrif!s  7  0  1 0 
5tatf!  t r· ad i n g  count.  1 3  -13  5 
Deveioping  countries  -3  -14  4 
O"f  which: 
ACP  -9  -13  -5 
Me d it.  basin  1 1  -12  3 
GSP  benef.  -5  -14  2 
G5P  benf!f.  excl  fuels  1 1  0  ::: 
TOTAL  4  -7  7 
Note:  The  growth  rate  for  1983-84  is  not  given  in  the  table 
because  1981-83  figures  correspond  to  EC-10  while  those  tor  the 
other  years  correspond  to  EC-12 
Source:  l:ur·ostat As  pointed  out  before  and  as  shown  in  Table  III  below,  fuels 
represent  a  major  component  of  EC  imports  from  GSP  countries. 
Indeed,  given  the  tall  in  the  value  of  oi 1  exports,  their  share 
in  total  exports  from  GSP  beneficiary  countries  to  the  EC  has 
declined  spectacularly  from  about  two  thirds  to  about  one 
quarter.  Meanwhile,  the  share  of  texti 1 es  has  doubled  from  its 
1981  level  and  the  other  industrial  products'  share  has  risen  to 
40". 
TABLE  III 
STRUCTURE  OF  EC  IMPORTS  FROM  GSP  BENEFICIARY  COUNTRIES 
<in  per  cent> 
1 981  1984  1 9::::3 
Food  and  agriculture  1 1  1 7  20 
Fuels  65  50  24 
Textiles  7  9  1 4 
Other  i n d .  products  1 6  23  40 
(  ·j  n c .  mining) 
TOTAL  1 00  100  100 
Source:  Eurosti:lt 
However,  the  increasing  i.mportance  of  textiles  and  other 
industrial  pr-oducts  in  GSP  countries  exports  to  the  EC  is  not 
just  the  result  of  the  decline  in  the  impoPtance  o"f  o·ii.trade. 
As  shown  1n  Table  IV  below,  expoPts  of  industrial  pl'oducts  have 
expanded  more  vigorously  than  tota·l  GSP  countries'  exports  to  the 
EC. TABLE  IV 
AVERAGE  OF  ANNUAL  GROWTH  RATES  OF  EC  IMPORTS 
FROM  GSP  BENEFICIARY  COUNTRIES 
( i  n  per  cent) 
1981-83  1 984-E:6  1986-88 
Food  and  agr1 cu·l tu!'e  1 0  -5 
F ue  ·1  s  -15  -2.7  -12 
Textiles  6  3  9 
Other  ind.  products  11  2  1 4 
( i  n c .  mining) 
TOTAL  -5  -13  2 
TOTAL  LESS  FUELS  1 1  0  8 
q 
Note:  As  fop  tile  absence  ot  growth  rates  for  1983-84,  see  note  to 
Table  III 
Source:  EuPostat 10 
Chapter 3:  The  Community's  GSP  scheme. 
Introductionv 
Follm..;ing the  above  general analysis of  trade  floHs  bet\-veen  the  GSP  countries 
and the  Community,  this chapter revieHs  the Community's  GSP  scheme in  some  detail. 
As  much  as  possible emphasis  will  be  given  to  quantitative  evidence.  The  first  part 
deals  '.·lith  trade  and  benefit coverage.  It describes  the  trade regime  faced  by  GSP 
countries exporting to the Community.  The second  part analyses the  GSP  scheme  from 
a product group point of view. As there are major differences between product groups, 
this is  relevant in  vie\-v  of  the  revision  of  the  scheme.  The  third  part analyses  the 
GSP  scheme  from  a  country  point  of  view.  Which  countries  have  been  the  main 
beneficiaries of the scheme, and t-.hat can be said about the distribution of GSP  benefits 
between  low  and  high  income  countries,  are  some  of  the  questions  Hhich  will  be 
answered. Lastly, a  comparison Hill also be made bet\'17een  the Community's preferential 
trade arrangements  Hith  on  the  one  hand  the  GSP  countries  and  on  the  other the 
ACP  and  Mediterranean countries. 
Trade and benefit coverage. 
This  section  describes  briefly  what part  of  trade  is actually  covered  by  the 
GSP  scheme. 
Trade from GSP beneficiaries can be roughly divided into the folloNing categories: 
Firstly, trade  Hhich  enters the  Community  duty  free  any\·lay,  because  the  HFN  rate 
is set at  zero.  Secondly, trade that is specifically excluded  from the GSP  scheme.  This 
concerns  primarily  agricultural  goods  and  a  number  of  industrial  goods.  Thirdly, 
imports that fall or are covered under the GSP  scheme, of \vhich in turn a  part actually 
receives  preferential treatment u. The  table  below  presents  the  details._-
1/  The  analysis  of  the  GSP  scheme  is  severely  hampered  by  lack  of  data. 
Although  it is  expected  that the  Statistical Office  of  the  European  Communities 
(EUROSTAT)  <·lill  make  available  additional data,  the  present analysis is  based  on 
the  regularly  produced  statistics.  These  hoHever do  not  a1lov1  an  analysis  of  the 
degree of  preferences extended  to  eligible  countries.  Note  also  that starting  from 
1988  South  Korea  has  been  excluded  from  the  GSP  scheme;  this is  taken into 
account  by  the  statistics presented in  this chapter. 
2/  Note  that in  v.rhat  folloHs  GS P  covered  trade  Hill  also  be  referred  to  as  GS P 
eligible  trade.  GSP  benefits  stand  for  trade  that has actually  received  preferential 
treatment. 11 
Table 1: Composition EC  imports from GSP  countries by import regime  (in percentages). 
MFN  zero  Not  covered  Covered 
duty  by  GSP  by  GSP 
1981  73.6  6.1  20.3 
1982  69.1  7.7  23.2 
1983  64.0  10.1  25.8 
1984  58.5  10.7  30.8 
1985  55.8  U,.3  33.0 
1986  45.2  18.0  36.8 
1987  42.7  13.0  44.3 
1988  39.4  13.8  46.7 
Source:  Estimates  Commission  services, 
The rapicUy declining  share of duty free  imports from GSP  beneficiaries can  be 
attributed to the  fall in oil prices and exchange rate movements  between the ECU  and 
tt)e US  dollar. It does theref9re not re111resent a  tightening of the import regime.  The 
share  of  non-covered  GSf  ht~pons  provides  an  idea  about  the  magnitude  of  the 
exclusions  from  the  system.  Non-covered  imports  increase  up  to  1986,  when  they 
amounted to  18  percent of the total, this largely  being  a  reflection of the decreasing 
share of MFN  zero duty imports. After 1986 the share of non-covered imports decreases. 
This latter  decrease  can  probably  be  attributed to  the  review of  the  scheme  which 
took place in 1986. l·lhat matters is the relationship between the non:-covered  part and 
the covered  part of the  imports.  This  ~s shol·m  in the  next table. 
Table  2:  Coverage  of GSP  trade  (in  percentages). 
Share sensitive  products: 
Coverage  Benefit  in  GSP  in  GSP  Ratio 
ratio  +atio  covered  received  (4)/(5) 
( 1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  {6) 
1981  73.2  . 29.2  62.1  51.3  120.9 
1982  72.3  28.7  62.4  52.8  118.0 
1983  68.3  27.6  61.2  54.4  112.6 
1984.  71.3  29.9  62.3  56.9  109.5 
1985  71.5  32.7  64.8  62.1  104.3 
1986  64.6  24.5  61.7  55.0  112.2 
1987  73.7  30.3  59.1  48.8  121.2 
1988  77.2  31.3  55.7  45.5  122.3 
Source:  Commission  servtces 12 
The  second  column  shows  the  coverage  ratio, that  is that part of  dutiable  EC 
imports originating in GSP  countries that falls under the GSP  scheme. In other words, 
it shows that part of imports  from eligible  countries,  which in  principle could benefit 
from preferential treatment. While  the data is fairly comparable over the  period shown, 
it should  be  borne  in  mind  that from  1987  onwards  it no longer includes imports  in 
product categories  from  countries whose  exports have  been  graduated/excluded from 
the  scheme.  As  the  data  shows,  the  coverage  ratio  is  fairly  stable  over  time.  The 
coverage of the  scheme is fairly comprehensive, about  70  percent of  all imports from 
eligible countries qualify in  principle  for  preferential treatment. 
Quota/ceilings,  but  also  nonfulfilment  of  administrative  requirements  and/or 
non-compliance with rules of origin requirements, cause a  much lower actual utilisation 
of the GSP  benefits.  This is shown  in  the  thir(i  column  of  table  2,  the  benefit ratio, 
here defined as that part of dutiable imports from GSP  countries that actually benefits 
from  GSP  preferential treatment.  The  benefit ratio peaks in  1985,  after which it falls 
to  a  level of  about  31  percent  in  1988.  No  clear trend  can  be  discerned.  Moreover, 
the actual reasons for the movements  in the  benefit ratio are  hard to identify at this 
level of aggregation.  Changes in  product composition,  price  movements,  and changes 
in the administration  of  the  regime  are all factors  which  might influence  the benefit 
ratio. 
The  fourth  and  fifth  columns of the  table  deal with  sensitive goods.  Column  4 
shows  the  share  of  sensitive  goods  in  total  eligible  GSP  imports  v,  while  the  fifth 
column  presents  the  share  of  sensit!ve  goods  in  GSP  imports  \vhich  have  actually 
received GSP  benefits. The high share of the sensitive products is striking; it amounts 
to about 60  percent of covered GSP  imports, but it has  been declining since 1985,  due 
to the  policy  of differentiation and  the  exclusion  of  Korea  from  the  scheme  in  1988. 
As for actual GSP  benefits, the share of sensitive goods is consistently lower compared 
to  covered  imports;  this  confirms  that  for  sensitive  products  it  is  generally  more 
difficult  to  obtain  preferential  treatment.  The  last  column  of  the  table  provides  an 
idea about the extent to  Hhich it is more  difficult to obtain  preferential treatment for 
sensitive  products.  It  shows  the  ratio  of  the  two  columns  (the  columns  4  and  5) 
multiplied by 100. A ratio of 100  would imply that sensitive and non-sensitive products 
would have an  equal probability  of receiving  actually GSP  benefits.  As  mentioned  this 
is  not  the  case;  in  the first  half  of  the  eighties  the  ratio  shovls  a  down  ward  trend 
up. to  1985.  From  1986  onwards it rises again,  indicating that it  )?as  become  relatively 
more  difficult  to  benefit from  preferential treatment for sensitive goods. 
1/  The  definition  of  sensitive  goods is  a  rather broad  one. It includes  goods 
Hhich  are subject to  some  form  of  surveillance.  This  can  be  either quotas or ceil-
ings,  but also  mere  surveillance.  'l'his  definition  is  in  accordance  v-Tith  the  practice 
applied  in  the  compilation  of  GS P  statistics. For  1988  the  impact  of  the  GSP 
system  on  imports  from  GSP  countries 
is summarised in the chart on the right. 
Starting from the  total dutiable  imports 
from GSP  countries (100%),  a  distinction 
is made between not-covered (22.8%)  and 
covered  imports  (77.2%).  The  covered 
part of imports are in turn broken down 
by  sensitive  (43.0%)  and  non-sensitive 
products (34.2).  For each  of  these two 
groups  the  bottomline  indicates  the 
distribution  between  that  part  of 
IMPACT  OF  GSP  SYSTEM  IN  1988 
Dutiable  imports 
pool 
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sensitive and  non-sensitive  products respectively  which- did  or did  not  benefit from 
preferential  treatment  .. It  shoHs  clearly  that  a  much  smaller  part  of  the  sensitive 
product benefited from preferential treatment compared to the non-sensitive  products~ 
even of the non-sensitive products only 50  percent benefited actually from preferential 
treatment. 14 
Coverage and  benefits by product groups. 
ThiE::  section  reviews  the  coverage  of  the Community  GSP  scheme  by  product 
groups. Four product groups are distinguished, agriculture, textile products (comprising 
MFA,  non-1-iFA,  jute  and  coir),  industrial products  and  petroleum  products.  Table  3 
presents the  details. 
Table 3:  Distribution GS P imports, covered imports and imports \>lith  actual preferential 
treatment  by  product groups  (in  percentages) 
1981  imports 
covered 
received 
1982  imports 
covered 
received 
1983  imports 
covered 
received 
1984  imports 
covered 
received 
1985  imports 
covered 
received 
1986  imports 
covered 
received 
1987  imports 
covered 
received 



























































































































a/  Not  separately  available,  included  under  other  industrial  products.  The  1981 
data pertaining  to industrial products are  therefore  not comparable  Hith  those 
for later years. 
Source:  EUROSTAT 
Table  3  sho\vS  in  the  first  place  the  distribution  of  total  imports  from  GSP 
countries  by  main  product  categories.  Price- and  exchange  rate  movements,  as  well 
as  real  c~anges in  the  composition  of  imports  from  GSP  countries  have  caused  a 15 
substantial  shift in  the  product  composition  of  imports  from  GSP  countries.  In  the 
early  eighties  about  t•·•o  thirds of  total  imports  from  GSP  countries  consisted  of  oil 
and oil products. In 1988 this  share uas reduced to only 24.4  percent. Simultaneously, 
the shares of textiles and other industrial products has increased, and combined these 
imports account  nou  for  almost 55  percent of  total imports from  GSP  countries. 
Due  to  lack  of  data,  it  is  not  possible  to  show  the  share  of  IviFN  zero  duty 
imports in  each  of  the  distinguished product categories  for  each  of  the years;  this, 
in  turn,  Hould  allaH  the calculation  of coverage- and  benefit ratio's  similar  to  one's 
shot·m  earlier.  Yet, on  the  basis of  1987  data it is  known  that the  coverage  ratio,  as 
defined already, varies considerably from product group to product group. The coverage 
ratio amounted in that year to 57  percent for agricultural goods, 84  percent for textiles 
and 78  percent for industrial goods, including petroleum products. Consequently, there 
appears to exists an inverse relationship between the coverage ratio and the distribution 
of GSP  benefits. Product groups t-lith  a  low coverage ratio have a  relatively high share 
in the benefits, product groups with a  high coverage ratio have a  relatively lo\·1  share 
in  the  benefits.  Therefore,  agriculture products  have  a  relatively  low  coverage,  but 
combine this ·1.-1ith  a  relatively high share in benefits in relation to its share in covered 
imports;  textile  products  have  a  high coverage  ratio,  but  a  relatively  low  share  in 
benefits.  Industrial products, including  petroleum products, possess  an  intermediate 
position. To  this  should  ho\-Jever  be added  that in  the case of agricultural goods  the 
benefits  are  mostly  extended  in  the  form  of  a  duty  reduction,  rather  than  a  duty 
c:·:emptiG!-,,  "hic:h  is  the case  for industrial products.  This duty exemption  amounts  to 
as  much  as  etbout  14  percent in  the  case of  textiles. 
Another presentation of the finding that the GSP  benefits across product groups 
are  not  distributed  in  accordance  \-lith  their  respective  shares in  eligible imports  is 
shoHn  in  the  table  beloH.  This  table  presents  for each  of  the  product  groups  the 
share  of  GSP  covered  imports  v<hich  actually  received  GSP  preferential  treatment. 16 
Table  4:  Share  of  GSP  covered  imports  Hhich  actually  received  GSP  preferential 
treatment.  (in  percentages) 
Agriculture  Textiles  Other  Petroleum 
industrial  products 
1981  55.8  14.5  43.4  n.a.tV 
1982  54.5  15.0  33.7  73.8 
1983  53.8  17.2  32.6  72.4 
1984  53.0  15.7  34.9  73.0 
1985  56.9  17.1  36.9  77.7 
1986  53.7  16.3  32.9  75.8 
1987  59.6  16.7  35.8  80.5 
1988  66.3  22.1  39.7  48.6 
a/  Not  separately  available,  included  under other  industrial  products.  The  1981 
data pertaining  to industrial products are therefore  not comparable  with  those 
for later years. 
Consistent with  the  observation  above,  agricultural products once  included  in 
the system stand  a  much  higher chance of  receiving  preferential treatment.  About  60 
percent  of  eligible  GSP  agricultural  imports,  and  even  almost  t't·7o  thirds  in  1988, 
actually  received  preferential treatment.  In  the case  of  textiles  it is  only  20  percent 
of covered imports ;;hich actually received  preferential treatment.  Industria.! products 
and  petroleum exports  are  positioned in  betHeen agriculture and  textiles. 
Coverage and  benefits by countries. 
This section reviews the distribution of the coverage and benefits of the system 
by  eligible  countries.  It  consists  of  two  parts;  the  first  part  identifies  the  top  10 
beneficiaries of the scheme during the eighties. The second part analyses the distribution 
of  benefits  by  income  level  of  the  beneficiaries.  This  last  analysis  is  particularly 
relevant in  vieH  of  the  contemplated  differentiation  of  beneficiary  countries. 
It is often argued  that only  a  limited  number of countries have  really  benefited 
from  the  GSP  scheme.  Obviously,  countries  ~·1hich  develop  the  capability  to  produce 
for the \·1orld  market stand a  much better chance to benefit from  preferential treatment 
under the  GSP  scheme.  An  identification  of  the  main  beneficiaries  of  the  GSP  scheme 
over  time  shows  that there  has  been  considerable  changes.  Firstly,  comparing  1981, 
1985  and  1988,  as  shoHn  in  table  5,  it can  be  seen  that OPEC  countries  have  almost 
completely  disappeared  from  the  list  of  top  ten  beneficiaries.  In  terms  of  benefits, 
there has been a  shift  to countries producing manufactures. Secondly,  differentiation, 
formally  incorporated  in  th~  Community's  GSP  scheme  in  1936  Has  in  fact  already 
pr2tcticed  before  that  year.  In  this  :respect it  is interesting  to  compare  the  ranking 
of  the  countries  '.rith  respect  t.c  GSP  trad.;:  cO'/erage  and  GSF  trade  benefits. It can 17 
be  seen that for  oil  e>:porting  countries the  scheme  has  been  particularly attractive; 
most oil exporting  countries combine  a  low  share in trade covered  -v:ith  a  high  share 
in  GSP  benetits,  e.g.  Kmvait,  Venezuela.  The  scheme  has  therefore  been  biased  in 
favour  of  oil  products.  Furthermore,  for  countries  like  Hong  Kong,  Singapore  and 
Korea  their  ranking  in  terms  of  benefits  has  ahvays  been  considerably  lower  than 
their ranking in  terms of covered trade, implying that these countries have been  less 
successful in actually  obtaining preferential treatment due to  quota, ceilings, rules of 
origin etc. 
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China 
Hong  kong 
Saudi Arabia 
l•ialaysia 
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Lool-:ing  at the  distribution of benefits in  1988, it is interesting to observe  that 
C'hina  hzts  bec-ome  the  main  beneficiary of  the  Community's  GSP  scheme, just ahead  of 
Bra:il;  B:-·:;:.:.~  h.:~s  ho11ever  a  considerably loHer share in  GSP  c·:>vered  trade,  implying 18 
that the  system is  more  favourable  to  China.  Asian  countries dominate;  seven  out of 
the  top  beneficiaries  are  located in  Asia.  The  position  of India is  also  noteworthy; it 
has a  relatively lo;,r  share in GSP  covered trade compared to its share in GSP  bene,fits. 
Lastly,  the  A  SEAN  countries combined  are  also  one  of  the  main  beneficiaries  of  the 
scheme. 
As  differentiation  is one  of  the  policy  objectives currently  investigated, it  is 
interesting to find out as to Hhether the current scheme already differentiates among 
groups  of  countries  classified  by  their  income  level.  For  this  purpose  table  6  has 
been  compiled,  whi•::h  shot-rs  for  four  income  groups  the  coverage- and  the  benefit 
ratio,  as well  as  the  share  in  covered  imports  Hhich  actually  received  GSP  benefits. 
The  classification  of  countries is  reproduced in  appendix  II, and  is  taken  from  the 
1989  World  Development  Report. 
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Coverage ratio  ~Y 
80.8  54.7  76.3 
90.0  54.2  66.6 
86.7  55.3  66.9 
94.8  74.2  68.6 
89.3  74.7  60.1 
Benefit ratio 
38.6  29.0  28.4 
40.4  29.8  23.0 
43.0  29.2  28.1 
42.5  39.3  23.6 
44.9  39.2  24.1 
Benefits as  a  percentage of covered 
47.8  53.0  37.3 
44.8  54.9  34.5 
49.6  52.8  41.9 
44.9  52.9  34.4 
50.3  52.5  40.1 
co•;erage  ratio  in  excess  of  100  percent 


















is  caused  by  the inclusion 19 
As  for  the  coverage  ratio, it is  clear that both lmv- and high  income  countries 
have  a  fairly  comprehensive  coverage.  The  coverage  ratio  is  the  lm-1est  for  the 
upper-middle income countries. Consequently, the  loH·er- and the upper middle  income 
countries appear to  have  the  highest interest in  an  extension  of the  coverage  of  the 
scheme.  As  for the  benefit ratio,  that is that part of  dutiable  imports  Hhich  actually 
receives preferential treatment, there has alHays  been a  tendency that the higher the 
level of income,  the lo\'1er  the benefit ratio.  The sharp fall  of the  benefit ratio for the 
high  income countries  and  to  a  lesser extent for  the  upper-middle  income  countries 
can  be attributed  to  the  policy  of differentiation  formally  adopted after 1985. 
Differentiation is  also  clear  from  the  bottom  of  table  6,  vthich  shovts the  GS P 
benefits expressed as a  percentage of  covered  trade,  being,  in  fact,  the  ratio  of the 
benefit- and coverage  ratio.  Both for  lot-I  and lol-.er middle  income countries this  ratio 
is  in  excess  of  50  percent;  for  upper-middle  and  higher  income  countries this  ratio 
is substantial  lot-~er, Hhile  for the latter group  of countries it shows  a  strong  decline 
after  1985. 
The  position of  the least developed countries is someNhat hiddden in the above 
table.  These  countries,  with  a  single  exception  belonging  to the group  of  low  income 
countries,  merit  hovrever  separate  attention.  This  is  particularly  so  because  to  the 
group of  loh'  income countries  belong  such  countries  as  China,  India,  Pakistan  and 
Indonesia  t-<hich  are  important  beneficiaries  from  the  GSP  scheme  {compare  table  5). 
Th".'!  positi0n  of  the  least  developed  countries  can  be  gauged  from  the  table  belot-7, 
;ihich  shot·rs,  quite  similar  to  table:  6,  the  coverage- the  benefit  ratio  and  the  GSP 
benefits expressed  as  a  percentage  of  covered trade. 
Table  7:  Coverage  and  benefit  ratio  of  the  least developed  countries. 
1981  1983  1985  1987  1988 
Coverage  ratio  87.3  80.4  36.1  98.8  94.9 
B":n'=fit  r.:,tio  53.7  48.0  51.3  65.~  58.2 
Benefits as  a  percentage  of  covered  61.5  59.7  59.6  66.0  61.4 
trade 
Table  7  shaHs indeed that the  least developed  countries  have  benefited  from  a 
relatively more generous treatment of their imports in the Community. Both the coverage-
and the benefit ratio are considerably  higher, Hhen compared Hith those of the group 
of lou income  countries shoHn in  table 6.  Furthermore, at the end  of the eighties,  the 
coverag~ of  the  imports from  the least developed  countries  was almost  complete,  '-lith 
the  benefit  ratio  standing  at about  60  percent,  almost tuice  as  high  as  for all  GSP 
elig.!.bl~  C8 1Jntries combined  (see  tabl~  2).  The  large gap  bet~·reen on  the  one hand  the 
b·:ndit  rcttio  of  the  least  developed  countries  and  on  the  other  all  GSP  countries 
.::-orr.bir~"'d  i:·nplies,  of  course,  a  very  smnll  share  of  the  least  d·::·:elcpec  countries  in 20 
total  GSP  imports.  In  fact,  in  1988,  imports  from  the  least developed  GSP  countries 
amounted  only to  1.1  percent of  total imports  from  GS P  countries, Hhich in turn  ·..;as 
equival'=nt  to  about  0.::!  percent of  total  extra-E~C imports. 
From a  trade policy point of vieN vis-a-vis developing countries it is interesting 
to compare  the GSP  countries uith the  group of  ACP  countries and the  l•Iediterranean 
countries.  Also  the  last  tHo  groups  of  countries  benefit  from  preferential  treatment 
in  the  Community  market,  Nhich  is  generally  of  a  more  generous  nature.  For  this 
purpose,  the  table  beloH  has  been  compiled. 
Table  8:  Th~ Community's  preferential trade  arrangements  Hith  developing  countries 
in  1987. 
Imports  HFN  = 0  Dutiable  Covered  81  Benefitsal 
All  LDCs  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
ACP  14.7  19.4  11.3  13.7  24.9 
Hediterranean h/  10.5  10.5  10.6  12.9  23.4 
GSP  countries  (';/  74.7  70.1  78.1  73.4  51.7 
GSP  - lot-1  10.5  5.9  13.8  15.9  13.0 
GSP  - lot-;er  middle  13.0  11.9  13.9  12.5  12.0 
GSP  - upper middle  34.5  35.9  33.4  27.9  17.4 
GSP  - high  16.0  16.0  16.0  17.1  9.2 
Ct/  In  the  C:ct~e  of  th-::  ACP  and  I !editerranean countries it  has  been  assumed  that 
all dutiable  imports are  covered by  the preferential trade arrangement, as  t-rell 
as that the~:e  import~: have actually received preferential treatment. This results 
ln  ·:1  ::;light  upt;arcl  bias  in  the  shares  of  ACP  and  I<Iediterranean  countries  in 
covered  and  bene-fited  trade. 
b/  Tunisia,  1-Iorocco,  Algeria1  Egypt,  Libanon,  Jordan  ,  Syria. 
c.:  ::ig;_d:··2:::'  mig lit  not  .:tdd  up  due  to  rounding. 
Table  B  confirms  again  the  importance  of  GSP  countries in  total imports  from 
developing  countries.  r~cp  countries  account  only  for  14.7  percent  in  total  imports 
from  developing  c;~)untries  and  Hediterranean  countries  for  about  10  percent.  ACP 
countries  hav-::  ct  relativE:ly  high  share  in  non-dutiable  imports  ancl  their  share  in 
preferential imports  is  more  than  t.1;ice  as  high  as  could  be e:<pected  on  the  basis  of 
their  shetre  in  dutiable  imports.  For  I-1editerranean  countries  this  ratio  is  equally 
favourable.  As  Has  demonstrated  before,  the  lm·J  income  GSP  countries  are  generally 
treated  more  favourably  thctn  the  higher  income  countries,  yet,  :~z  the  table  shov1s, 
compared  to  the  ACP  and  1-Iediterranean  countries,  loH  income  GSP  countries  benefit 
considerably  le~::-5  from  Fl:c:f-:,r<:!ntial  treatment. APPENDIX  I 
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SINGAPORE ANNEXE  II 
SPG  1990  -QUELQUES  SIAIISI!QUES  DE  GEST!ON 
1.  Nombre  de  montants  0reterentlels admlnlstres  (Coree  exclue) 
Bon  nombre  des  preferences  tarlfalres general !sees  sont  assortles,  en 
ce  qui  concerne  de  nombreux  pays  en  vole  de  developpement 
speclflques,  d'une  1 Imitation sur  Ia  quantlte qui  peut  en  beneflcler. 
Ces  I Imitations  prennent  Ia  forme  notamment  de  contingents 
tarlfalres,  de  montants  fixes et  de  plafonds  tarlfalres, et  el les 
demandant  un  traval I  administratif  de  Ia  part  non  seulement  des  Etats 
membres  mats  aussl  des  services de  Ia  Commission  (XXI/A/2). 
Le  nombre  de  ces montants  preferentlels  (Ia  Coree  exclue)  figure cl-
dessous  : 
Mont ants  fixes  Contingents  Plafonds 
Prodults  lndustrlels  106  - 135 
Produ Its  text I 1  es  10  373  442 
Prodults  agrlcoles 
- soumls a drolts  5  - -
de  douane 
- soumls  a preleve- 8  - -
ment 
Produ  It~  CECA  - 11  6 
2.  Epulsements  connus  au  31.3.90 
Pour  les  prodults  soumls  a contingent  tarlfalre ou  montant  fixe,  les 
administrations  douanleres  des  Etats  membres  procedent  a un  tlrage 
sur  le  montant  concerne  des  qu'el les  recolvent  une  demande  de 
benefice  dament  justlflee.  Les  tlrages contlnuent  jusqu'a  epuisement 
du  montant. 
Le  nombre  d'epulsements  connus  au  31.3.90  figure  ci-dessous 
Produits  industrlels  49 
Prodults  text! les  94 
Prodults  agricoles 
I  0  I  A L  144 
Parmi  ces  epulsements,  63  ont  eu  I leu .Je  3.1.1990  (c'est-a-dlre  d~s 
te  premier ,Jour  de  teur  dlsponlbl t lte). - 2  -
3.  Clauses  de  retour  effectyees  <seyls  textIles) 
Les  contingents  tarlfalres pour  les  prodults  textl les  comportent  deux 
tranches,  dont  une  est  preallouee  comme  quote-part  lnltlale aux  Etats 
membres  pour  leur  gestlon dlrecte,  et  l'autre constltue une  reserve 
communautalre  geree  par  les  services de  Ia  Commission.  Quand  un  Etat 
membra  a  epulse  sa  quote-part  lnltlale  I I  tire sur  Ia  reserve.  Dans 
le  cas ou  une  reserve est  presque epulse  une  clause  de  retour  est 
prevue  salon  laquel le  les  Etats  membres  dolvent  reverser  A Ia 
Commission  les  quantltes  eventual las  de  leurs  quotes-parts  lnltlales 
qu' I Is  n'ont  pas  uti I lsees.  Dans  certains  cas  les  reversements 
dolvent  se  falre  en  deux  etapes. 
Les  clauses  de  retour  effectuees  Jusqu'au  31.3.90 peuvent  se  resumer 
convne  suit  · 
B~:~:.:~:~r::~u~m~:mts  B!:!lli:II:SI:Imi:ID1S 
- a l  6taoe  a 2  e·:aoes 
50  %  sol de  TOTAL 
Janvier  48  29  18  95 
tevrler  10  6  1  17 
mars  9  9  12  30 
4.  S8!ectiOD  de  transactiOD§  tr::altOe§  ayotldlennement  par  le§  services 
de  Ia  eommlsslon 
Dans  leur  gestlon  des  contingents  tarlfalres et montants  fixes,  les 
services de  Ia  Commission  (XXI/A/2)  procedent  chaque  jour  a 
1 'enregistrement  et  au  traltement  des  communications  des  Etats 
membres.  Ces  communications  ont  trait notamment  aux  quantltes a tlrer 
ou  a reverser  sur  les divers montants  preferentlels.  Pour  chaque 
tlrage ou  reversement,  une  transaction dolt !tre operee  sur  le  solde 
du  montant  preferential  concerne. 
Le  nombre  de  transactions traltees alnsl  Jusqu'au  31.3.90  peut  se 
resumer  comma  suit  (callas des  8.1.90,  19.1.90 et  6.2.90  o~t ete 
partlcul lerement  nombreuses)  : 
Tlrages  Revers.  Divers  TOTAL 
8.1.90  734  - - 734 
19. 1 . 90  1  049  268  1  1  318 
6.2.90  814  146  3  963 
moyenne 
jan-mars  167,8  13,4  20,9  202,1 5. 
- 3  -
T61ex  et  te!etax 
La  gestlon des  montants  fixes et  p!afonds  a,  jusqu'au 31.3.90, 
demande  !'frnvol  aux  Etats membres  des  communications  sulvantes 
(envoyees  par  telex  au  telefax  selon  !es moyens  de  chaque 
Administration  douanlere)  : 
Jan.  tev.  mars  TOTAL 
-a! locations  Journal lares  18  20  22  60 
- epulsements  6  13  13  32 
- declenchement  d'une 
clause de  retour  13  12  19  44 
- rapports mensuels  1  1  1  3 
T 0  T A L  38  46  55  139 
Chaque  communication  vlsee  cl-dessus est  envoyee  a un  nombre 
Important  de  destlnatalres dans  !es Etats membres.  Certains de  ces 
telexes ant  attaint  une  longueur  de  10  metres. 
En  plus,  de  nombreuses  communications  sent  echangees  avec  les  Etats 
membres  concernant  Ia  regularlsatlon des  annees  precedentes alnsl  que 
Ia  survel 1 lance  des  plafonds tar!falres et  bases  de  reference,  et  les 
retabllssements eventuels  des  drolts de  douane  normaux. 
6.  Coat  d'admlnlstratlon  SPG  (ECUS) 
MIS  a part  le  coat  du  personnel  et  des  bureaux,  le  coat  de  Ia  gestion 
du  SPG  resulte  de  l'utl I lsatlon de  moyens  lnformatlques et  de 
telecommunications.  Une  estimation  du  coat  annual  en  ce  qui  concerne 
les services de  Ia  Commission  (XXI/A/2)  et  un  Etat  membre, 
a  prodult  les chlffres sulvants  (en  ECUS): 
Frals d'ordlnateur  Telecommunications  TOTAL 
XXI/A/2  18  750  53  750  72  500 
Repub !!que 
tederale 
d'AIIemagne  526  500  223  500  750  000 
Sur  cette base  le  coat  total  de  Ia  gestlon  du  SPG  au  nlveau  de  Ia 
Communaute  pourralt  ~tre estlme a 3  ml  I I len  d'ECUS. Annexe ll.I 
Las  re~les  d'ori~ine 
A.  Description des  re~les d'ori~ine preferentielles actuelles 
l.  Les  regles d'origine applicables dans  le cadre d'un regime 
preferentiel tel que le SPG  fixent les conditions  sous 
lesquelles les produits des  pays beneficiaires peuvent 
beneficier  d~ traitement preferentiel a  !'importation dans  la 
CommunauteClJ.  Un  produit  ne  peut done beneficier des 
preferences  prevues  que s'il satisfait aux  regles d'origine 
prevues  dans le cadre de  l'accord avec le(s)  pays  concerne(s) 
ou  appliquees dans le cadre d'un regime  autonome. 
2.  Ces  regles  concernant  notamment  le degre et la nature  des 
ouvraisons et des  transformations  requises  pour  obtenir 
l'origine d'un pays beneficiaire du  SPG  lorsque des  matieres, 
pieces et composants  importes d'autres  pays  sont utilises dans 
la fabrication d'un produit. 
3.  Dans  le cadre des  regimes  preferentiels,  l'origine est basee 
sur la notion de la transformation suffisante dans  un  pays  (ou 
groupement  de  pays)  particulier.  La  notion de  "transformation 
suffisante"  est definie selon la m§me  approche 
systematique dans  tous  les accords et arrangements 
preferentiels conclus  ou  adoptes  par la Communaute  avec  ou 
vis-a-vis de  pays tiers.  Cette notion se  traduit par la regle 
generale du  changement de position tarifaire,  c'est-a-dire que 
le degre  de  transformation necessaire  pour  obtenir  un  produit 
· fini qui  releve d'une position tarifaire differente de  cell,e 
de  chacune  des matieres non  originaires utilisees,  est 
considere  comme  suffisant pour  oonferer  a  ce  produit le 
caractere originaire aux  fins de l'application du  traitement 
preferentiel. 
(l) Il ne  faut  pas  confondre les regles d'origine preferentielles 
avec  les regles d'origine non preferentielles,  qui  sont 
prevues  a  d'autres  fins. - 2  -
4.  Cette regle generale est assortie,  dans  taus  les accords  et 
arrangements preferentiels,  d'une liste d'exceptions  qui 
indique les produits  pour  lesquels des  conditions autres  que 
cette regle de base  au,  le cas  echeant,  supplementaires  A 
cette regle,  doivent etre remplies  pour  obtenir l'origine 
preferentielle.  Dans  le passe,  les accords  et arrangements 
vises  comportaient  deux listes,  l'une reprenant les produits 
pour  lesquels le changement de position tarifaire n'etait pas 
suffisant pour  conferer l'origine,  l'autre reprenant  les 
produits  pour  lesquels des  ouvraisons et transformations  ne 
resultant pas dans  un  changement  de position tarifaire 
pouvaient  neanmoins  etre considerees  comme  suffisantes. 
Lars de l'introduction du  systeme harmonise.  ces  deux  listes 
ant ete combinees,  ce qui constitue une  simplification 
considerable  pour  l'utilisateur. 
5.  Si cette  liste de  conditions differentes et/ou 
supplementaires est  "unique"  dans le cadre  de  chacun des 
regimes  preferentiels,  elle varie cependant  quelque  peu  entre 
les differents accords et arrangements.  Les  conditions 
prevues  sont ainsi plus restrictives dans  le cadre du  regime 
autonome  SPG  que dans  taus les accords  negocies.  Parmi  les 
accords negocies,  ces conditions sont plus  genereuses  pour  les 
pays  ACP  et les PTOM. 
6.  D'autres divergences entre les regles d'origine 
preferentielles apparaissent dans  le texte des differents 
protocoles  "origine"  des  accords  preferentiels,  notamment  en 
ce qui  concerne  : 
une  tolerance generale  en matieres  originaires de  pays 
tiers  (ACP  - PTOM)  et 
les dispositions relatives au  "cumul".  De  telles 
dispositions permettent a un pays beneficiaire de 
preferences de  tra.iter les produits originaires d'autres,-
pays bien precises  (par  exemple  :  membres  d'un groupement 
regional)  ou  bien les operations effectuees dans  ces  pays, 
comme  si ces  produits avaient ete obtenus,  ou  ces 
operations effectuees,  dans le pays  beneficiaire en 
question  (ACP  - PTOM  :  cumul  complet  entre eux et  avec  la 
CEE;  pays  mediterraneens  (autres que  Maghreb)  :  cumul 
bilateral CEE-pays  concerne). 
A taus  egards,  cependant,  les conditions  que  doivent 
satisfaire les pays  SPG  sont  plus restrictive3 que  celles que 
doivent satisfaire les autres  pays  en voie  de  developpement. - 3  -
B.  Quelques  aspects  economiques  des  re~les  d'ori~ine BEG 
7.  L'objectif des  regles d'origine preferentielles,  basees  sur 
la notion de la transformation suffisante dans ~  ~ 
benaficiaire est d'enoourager l'industrialisation des  pays 
benaficiaires du  SPG,  en subordonnant l'octroi du  traitement 
preferential a la condition d'atteindre un certain degre de 
transformation.  Cette condition est egalement  necessaire pour 
reserver ces  preferences aux  produits des  pays  concernes et 
pour  eviter qu'elles ne  s'appliquent a des produits dont  le 
contenu est largement attribuable a d'autres pays. 
8.  Ceci  cree un certain dilemme,  puisque d'une part le degre  de 
transformation exige doit etre suffisamment  eleve pour 
justifier l'application de la preference prevue  pour  le pays 
beneficiaire et pour  encourager l'implantation dans  ce  pays  de 
vraies industries de  transformation  (et non pas,  par  exemple, 
de  simples  entreprises d'assemblage de  produits originaires de 
pays industrialises);  d'autre part,  il faut  tenir compte  du 
fait que si les regles d'origine sont trop striates,  les pays 
concernes  pourraient avoir heauooup de difficultes d'atteindre 
le degre  de  transformation impose  et done d'obtenir 
l'application des preferences. 
9.  En  outre,  l'internationalisation croissante de  la production 
va a l'encontre de certaines exigences relatives ala 
necessite d'effectuer,  dans  un pays particulier.  un  certain 
degre  de  transformation et/ou certains types d'ouvraisons,  et 
le rend necessaire de  reconsiderer le niveau et la nature de 
ces  exigences.  En  effet,  dans  les annees  1980,  le  taux  de 
croissance des  echanges  mondiaux des biens  manufactures  (5,4% 
per  annum)  a  excede  de  60  % le taux de  croissance de  la 
production mondiale  (3,3% p.a.). 
10  Par ailleurs,  les regles d'origine sent  identiques  pour  touR 
les pays  SPG,  ce qui  comporte des  desavantages  pour  les 
economies  les mains  puissantes,  qui  n'ont  pas  les  memes 
possibilites de  developper  certaines industries et qui 
dependent  beaucoup plus sur le commerce  exterieur.  En 
consequence,  ces  pays  sont  obliges d'importer d'autres  pays 
certains  composants de produits qu'ils envisagent d'exporter a 
la Communaute,  et risquent de  ne  pas  pouvoir  satisfaire aux 
regles d'origine  SPG  et done  de  beneficier des  preferences 
prevues. - 4  -
11  Pour d'autres pays en voie de developpement.  a  savoir les pays 
ACP  et lee PTOM.  certaines des regles  d'or~gine sent 
effeotivement mains  restriotives que celles  actue~ement 
applioab1es  aux pays  SPG,  y  compris aux 9  PMA  non  ACP  entre 
eux  (Afghanistan.  Bangladesh.  Bhou.tan,  Laos.  Maldives, 
Mya.nma.r.  Nepal.  Yemen  du Nord.  Yemen  du ·Sud) .  Cette 
divergence n'est guere compatible avec l'esprit de la 
cooperation. 
12 S'il est difficile d'estimer avec precision l'impact des 
re~1es d'orig~e SPG.  il est toutefois clair que ces regles 
doivent faire l'&quilibre entre d'une part les exigenoes d'un 
inStrument de politique  co~erciale et d'autre part.  ce1les 
d 'un outll de developpement.  Une  tension existe entre 
!'imposition des  r~les d'origine restrictives qui fixent un 
degre de transfor:ma  tion et. dans certains oa.s.  un contenu en 
prodUits looaux.  assez  eleve.  et 1es tendances actuelles de la 
production mondia1e  en faveur  de la specialisation accrue. 
C'est dans oette optique qu'une revision des regles d'origine 
SPG  devrait etre oonsideree. 
C.  Orientations 
13 Il conviendr&it d'inclure la question des  regles d'origine 
dans le debat relatif au nouveau  schema  SPG  pour les annees 
90,  sans prejudice de la. procedure d'adaption des  dis~ositions 
en question qui est reservee a la Commission. 
14 Il est considere que pour ameliorer  l'acc~s au ma.rche 
communa.ut&ire des produits des pays  SPG  et pa.rticul.ierement 
des  PKA.  il oonvient d'apporter certains assouplissements aux 
r~gles d'origLne  SPG. 
15  Aucune modification des  dis~ositions SPG  actuelles n'est 
envisagee  en oe qui concerne  : 
les prodUits  enti~rement obtenus.  c'est-a-dire des produits 
de  La nature et les marchandises  fabriquees a partir de 
te~s produits sans  aucun apport de prodUits  importes;  et 
la substance des  unotes explicativesa. 
En consequence,  pa.r  exem.ple. il  n'y aura.it aucune :motlifioa.tion 
des  dispos~t~ons actuelles pour les produits de la peche  (sauf 
que le.  point  16  .  d)  ci-a.pres se refere  a taus 
prod:a.i  1;S) • - 5  -
16  Rn.  detail,  l.es  modi.£i.ca.ti.ons  a.  examiner. ~  .:t..aY.s.  l£s. ~ 
benef1c1a1res BEG.  seraient dans les domaines  s~vants 
a)  revision.  en vue d'y apporter des  am~liorations,  de la 
liste des  operat~ons con£erant l'origine qui remplacent, 
pour les produits concernes.  la regle generale du 
changement de position tarifaire,  visee au paragraphe  4  ci-
dessus. 
b) modifi.oati.on des  notes introductives de la Li.ste pour 
introduire une tolerance en matiere de  l 'utilisation de 
ga.rni.  tures et accessoires en ma tieres textiles; 
c)  introduction de dispositions relatives a.u  cumul  (type 
ab~ateral•) entre les produits originaires de la CEE  et 
l.es produits du pa.ys  SPG  concerne  ("element du pays 
donneur•);  La.  substance de cette innovation devrait etre 
de nature a comporter un a.vantage reel pour les pays  SPG; 
d)  les dispositions relatives au cumul regional  (ANASE,  MCAC, 
pacte andi n) seraient inchangees.  Toutefoi.s.  cel.l.es-ci 
pourr~ent etre etendues a d'autres groupements  regionaux 
tels que  l.e cone sud  (Argentine,  Bresil,  Uruguay) .  ALADI, 
SAARC  pourvu qu'ils sati.sfa.ssent a.ux  conditions prevues 
(application entre membres  du groupement  des  memes  regles 
d'origine,  i.nfrastructnre a.dmjnistrative suffisante pour 
permettre l'a.pplica.tion des  controles necessa.i.res  ...  ). 
l7 Ell .c.e.  qJli._  Q..QlJJ~ l.es..  l:HA,  en plus des  a.m~Hiora.  ti.ons visees 
ci-dessus en ce qui concerne taus les pays  beneficia~es du 
sPG.  il  est envisage que  ces pays beneficiera.ient d'autres 
modifications telles que l'introduction d'une tolerance 
gener&le de  l~ ai.nsi que d'une revision des dispositions 
rela.t~ves aux demandes de derogations.  pour  prevo~ que  1& 
Communaute  ua.ccede a toutes les demandes  de derogations des 
PMA  heil~fi.ciaires du  SPG  qui sont dnment  justif~ees et qui ne 
peuvent ca.user un grave prejudice a l.llle  ind.ustrie etablie de 
la.  Communa.u te. - 6-
18-Il convient  de  rappeler que la Communaute  et les pays  de 
l'AELE  appliquent les memes  regles d'origine dans le cadre  de 
leurs differents sohemas  SPG  et que  oe  lien comporte  des 
a. vantages  importa.nts  pour  las pays  benefioia.i res  SPG.  Dt':r: 
l'a.doption d'une position commune,  11  sera. done  necessaire 
d'aborder  avec les pa.rtenaires de  l'AELE  la question de  la 
continuation de  ce lien important. 